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Abstract
The role of arbitration in settling disputes which involves national and 
transnational commercial transactions is steadily growing in this era of 
globalisation. International and national rules governing various aspects of 
commercial arbitration have contributed to the effectiveness of arbitration as an 
alternative to litigation. The involvement of national courts is crucial to the 
overall efficacy of arbitration, both domestic and international. Instances 
calling for court intervention may appear at all stages of the arbitral 
proceedings. There is, however, a need to maintain a balance between the level 
of court involvement and the smooth functioning of arbitration - which is a 
contractual alternative to judicial dispute settlement. This article deals with the 
legal and practical role of Ethiopian courts during the three stages of arbitral 
proceeding, i.e., at the beginning of arbitration, during the arbitral proceedings, 
and after the end of the arbitration. And finally, I argue in favour of judicial 
restraint particularly during the first two stages of arbitral proceedings.
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Introduction
Arbitration is seen here as a non-judicial dispute settlement mechanism whereby 
parties to a dispute resort to a third party (or parties) whose determination over 
the dispute is as binding as comparable court decisions. Depending on various 
factors, one can distinguish different types of arbitration.* 1 For instance, a 
distinction can be made between international and domestic arbitration.2 Within
* LL.B, LL.M, Lecturer in Law, Bahir Dar University School of Law.
• The author is grateful to Jennifer Ward and the anonymous reviewers for their 
comments which enriched the initial version of the work.
1 See, e.g., Kroll, S. (2006) Arbitration, in Smits J. (ed.), Elgar Encyclopaedia of 
Comparative Law. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, p. 78 [hereinafter 
Kroll].
2 See n. 29 infra and the accompanying text.
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the domain of international arbitration, one may further distinguish between 
investment arbitration, commercial arbitration and arbitration between states.3
For the purpose of this article, commercial arbitration stands for arbitration 
of commercial disputes between private parties to either domestic or 
international transactions. i intend to use international commercial arbitration 
to refer to arbitration between Ethiopians, on the one hand, and private parties 
from foreign nations, on the other.4
This article mainly focuses on commercial arbitration - both domestic and 
international. Particularly, it deals with the role played by Ethiopian courts in 
commercial arbitration. it argues that Ethiopian courts should maintain a 
friendly attitude towards commercial arbitration.
The first section of the article highlights the different approaches regarding 
the role of courts in arbitration and examines the reasons why Ethiopian courts 
should retain a minimalist approach regarding commercial arbitration. The 
second and third sections deal with the historical and present state of the 
Ethiopian legal regime on arbitration. And, the fourth section takes us through 
the crux of the research, i.e. the practical role Ethiopian courts have thus far 
played in commercial arbitration and its impact on the efficacy of the latter.
1. The Interaction of Courts and Arbitral Tribunals: The 
Competing Approaches
Arbitration as a dispute settlement device has a history dating as far back as 
ancient civilisations in Egypt and Greece.5 Literature indicates that arbitration 
predates litigation.6 The gradual prominence of governmental dispute settlement 
bodies led to a period of judicial hostility towards arbitration. In what are now 
“arbitration friendly” jurisdictions like the USA, Great Britain and France, there 
was a long-standing jurisprudence against arbitration.7 The main reason for the
3 Kroll, supra n. 1, p. 78.
4 But see n. 29 infra.
5 Barrett, J. (2004) A History of Alternative Dispute Resolution. San Francisco, Jossey- 
Bass, pp. 1 et seq.; Zekos, G. (2008) International Commercial and Marine 
Arbitration. London, Routledge- Cavendish, pp. 9 et seq. [hereinafter Zekos].
6 Zekos, ibid, p. 9.
7 Martinez-Fraga, P. (2009) The American Influence on International Commercial 
Arbitration. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 6-14[hereinafter Martinez- 
Fraga]; Navarro, P. Challenges of awards vis-a-vis the finality of international 
arbitration, pp. 11. Available from: <www.consulegis.com> [last accessed 31 Oct., 
2010][hereinafter Navarro]; see also n. 45 infra.
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hostility between courts and arbitration was, inter alia, the belief that arbitration 
goes against public policy.8
Amidst this judicial attitude, however, the use and advantage of arbitration 
gained gradual ascendancy. Crucially, judicial prejudice against commercial 
arbitration has gradually faded away as the business sector “needed greater 
speed and flexibility for the settlement of their disputes than that provided by 
courts.”9 Moreover, neutral venues in the form of international arbitral tribunals 
have been in demand as international trade grew dramatically after World War 
II.10 This in turn led to gradual judicial accommodation of arbitration.
The traditional scepticism of arbitration now appears to have given way to 
remarkable judicial restraint. Yet, states have always kept arbitration under a 
certain level of court control. The desirability of a level of judicial assistance to 
and control over arbitration is now well understood.11 Nonetheless, a 
comparative analysis of national rules on commercial arbitration would reveal 
that the level of interaction between courts and arbitral tribunals varies from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.12
The most prevailing international trend confines judicial intervention to a 
minimum.13 This minimalist approach is represented by the United Nations 
Commission of International Trade Law Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration (UNCITRAL Model Law) and other comparable 
national arbitration laws. Aspects of this approach include the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements, the recognition of the principles of severability and 
competence-competence (Kompetenze-Kompetenze), the upholding of the 
finality of arbitral awards subject to certain fairness standards, the relative 
autonomy of arbitration from judicial intervention during the arbitral 
proceeding, and the enforcement of arbitral awards. Whereas, the maximalist 
approach is characterised by, for instance, the subjection of arbitral awards to
8 In the common law jurisdictions, for example, arbitration was perceived to be against 
public policy for it “ousted otherwise competent courts of their jurisdiction”; see 
Martinez-Fraga, p. 7.
9 Zekos, supra n. 5, pp. 16-20.
10 Craig, W. (1995) “some Trends and Developments in the Laws and practice of 
International Commercial Arbitration,” Texas International Law Journal, (30), p. 2 
[hereinafter Craig].
11see generally discussions under section 4 infra.
12 see generally Zekos, supra n. 5 for an excellent comparative analysis of the role of 
English, Us, Greek and Belgian courts in commercial arbitration.
13 See, e.g., Gu, W. (2009-2010) “Judicial Review Over Arbitration in China: Assessing 
the Extent of the Latest Pro-Arbitration Move by the Supreme People’s Court in the 
People’s Republic of China”, Wisconsin International Law Journal, (27), pp. 225-231; 
Kroll, supra n. 1, p.78.
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broader judicial review and the wider court intervention during the proceedings 
of the arbitration.
The challenge of maintaining a fair balance between “excessive judicial 
interference and necessary intervention” looks like an ever-ending endeavour as 
the minimalist-maximalist debate still continues with regard to judicial review 
of certain awards involving the application of such areas of law as antitrust.14
in this article, it is argued that Ethiopian courts must avoid excessive judicial 
interference with regard to commercial arbitration for the following reasons. 
First, arbitration is a method of dispute settlement which is based on the consent 
of parties to avoid litigation. Courts must not frustrate the parties’ freedom of 
contract by interfering in the arbitration process and thus making the latter 
redundant. Second, arbitration - unhampered by excessive court interference - 
is a desirable input for Ethiopia’s attempt to actively participate in international 
trade and attract foreign investment.15 Third, courts themselves may benefit 
from abstaining from unnecessary intervention in commercial arbitration.16
2. The Commercial Arbitration Regime of Ethiopia: Historical 
Overview
The Ethiopian legal framework for modern arbitration was laid down by the 
codifications of the 1950s and 60s. Before that, arbitration was only known 
within the context of traditional dispute resolution processes. For the major part 
of Ethiopian legal history, non-judicial dispute settlement methods played a 
significant role in resolving disputes in a traditional Ethiopian society. 
Shimguilina is one of the many traditional Ethiopian dispute settlement devices 
which could be approximated to what is now known as arbitration.17
14 Navarro, pp. 11 et seq.; see also Blanke, G. (2007) “The ‘Minimalist’ and 
‘Maximalist’ Approach to Reviewing Competition Law Awards: A Never Ending 
Saga”, Stockholm International Arbitration Review, (2), pp. 51-78.
15Asouzu A. lists numerous reasons why commercial arbitration is “an option of 
necessity and convenience for Africa in general; see Asouzu, A. (2001) International 
Commercial Arbitration and African States: Practice Participation and Institutional 
Development. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 27-50 [hereinafter 
Asouzu].
16Arbitrators should be seen as partners of judges in the administration of justice. They 
have a role to play in making the judiciary efficient by enabling the latter to avoid the 
unnecessary diversion of the limited judicial resources and time away from matters 
that require particular judicial attention.
17 Tilahun Teshome (2007), “The Legal Regime Governing Arbitration in Ethiopia.” 
Ethiopian Bar Review, 1(2), pp. 117-118 [hereinafter Tilahun]; Brietzke, P. (1974)
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Nonetheless, shimguilina seems a much wider concept than the modem notion 
of “arbitration”. The former combines aspects of different ADR mechanisms 
including mediation, conciliation, compromise and, of course, arbitration.18
Shimguilina, along with other forms of traditional dispute settlement 
processes, was well-liked by people living in rural Ethiopia - where access to 
state law enforcement organs used to be very limited.19 Apparently, it has also 
survived the transplantation of Western dispute settlement processes. Studies 
show that many people, including urban merchants, had widely used 
shimguilina “to save time and expense and to preserve business relations,” even 
well after the transplantation of Western-style dispute settlement systems.20 This 
traditional alternative dispute settlement device is still popular among the 21st 
century Ethiopian businesses, which often rely on it to settle disputes.21 Hence, 
arbitration has not been unknown to the traditional Ethiopian society.
The modern concept of commercial arbitration had, however, been alien to 
Ethiopia until at least mid-20th century, when Ethiopia developed most of its 
current codes on private law. Some provisions were made for arbitration in the 
1960 Civil Code and the 1965 Civil Procedure Code (CPC). Articles 3325 to 
3346 of the 1960 Civil Code govern the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
“Private Law in Ethiopia,” Journal of African Law, 18(2), p. 158 [hereinafter 
Brietzke].
18 Tilahun, ibid, pp. 117-118; Fekadu Petros (2009), “Underlying Distinctions between 
ADR, Shimglina and Arbitration” Mizan Law Review, 3(1), p.124 [hereinafter 
Fekadu].
19 For a fair discussion on the prominence of non-judicial dispute settlement 
mechanisms among the traditional Ethiopian societies and the uneasy attempt of the 
State to impose modern legal institutions, see, e.g., Singer, N. (1970-1971) “A 
Traditional Legal Institution in a Modern Legal Setting: the Atbia Dagnia of 
Ethiopia”, UCLA Law Review, 18, pp. 308 et seq.; Alula, Pankhurst & Getachew 
Assefa (2008) Grass-roots Justice in Ethiopia: the Contribution of Customary Dispute 
Resolution. Addis Ababa, CFEE [hereinafter Alula & Getachew].
20 Brietzke, supra n. 17, p.158.
21 See, e.g., a report by USAID (2007) Ethiopia Commercial Law & Institutional 
Reform and Trade Diagnostic, p.60 [hereinafter USAID Report]; Mintwab Zelelew & 
Mellese Madda (2008) Alternative Dispute Resolution in Addis Ababa: the Case of 
Markato, in ibid, Alula & Getachew, p. 250.
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in the form of either arbitral clauses or submissions.22 CPC, for its part, provides 
rules on some procedural aspects of arbitration.23
Ethiopia is a signatory to the Convention on the Settlement of investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention).24 
Unlike many of its sub-Saharan counterparts, however, Ethiopia has not yet 
ratified the 1965 Convention to which it was one of the first signatories. 
Moreover, Ethiopia is yet to join the 1958 New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.25 As a result, the two 
codes, both of which predate the modern international arbitration legislation 
represented by UNCITRAL Model Law, are for now26 the major sources of 
arbitration law in Ethiopia.
Ethiopia’s arbitration law seems “to be basically designed for domestic 
arbitration.”27 The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and CPC do not 
distinguish, except in the context of execution of foreign arbitral awards,28 
between domestic and international arbitration. It may thus appear that the 
Codes’ provisions on arbitration do not apply to “international”29 arbitration.
22 Appointment and replacement, disqualification, removal, competence and function of 
arbitrators along with effects of non-performance of arbitration agreement are 
generally governed by the 1960 Civil Code of Ethiopia [hereinafter Civil Code].
23 In particular, procedure before arbitration tribunal, making of an award, appeal from, 
setting aside and execution of an award are governed by rules of the 1965 Civil 
Procedure Code of Ethiopia [hereinafter CPC].
24 See the list of member states on the website of ICSID at <www.worldbank.org/icsid>.
25 Optimism on the eventual membership of Ethiopia to both the ICSID and New York 
Conventions surfaces as Ethiopia is now a member of regional trade zones which 
directly or indirectly encourage the adherence to such international conventions; see, 
in particular, Asouzu, p. 337.
26 To the best of my knowledge, a new law on arbitration is set to be promulgated in the 
near future.
27 Bezzawork Shimelash (1994) “The Formation, Content and Effect of an Arbitral 
Submission under Ethiopian Law” Journal of Ethiopian Law, 17, p. 90 [hereinafter 
Bezzawork].
28 Note, however, that foreign arbitral award is not synonymous to international 
arbitral award. International arbitral awards may of course be domestic for the 
purpose of enforcement if the arbitral tribunal rendering the award has sat in the very 
jurisdiction where enforcement is sought.
29 It is now uncommon for states to have two separate regimes of domestic arbitration 
and international arbitration. Initially, there was no distinction between international 
and domestic arbitration. According to one theory, the distinction has become relevant 
only after “the courts of various countries became involved in the conduct of 
arbitration and enforcement of arbitral awards”. The jurisprudence in many 
jurisdictions indicates that the nationality of the parties, the international nature of the
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Such an argument would, however, be weighed down by the practical 
applicability of the Codes’ provisions vis-a-vis international arbitrations sited in 
Ethiopia.30
Incidentally, the term commercial which appears important in contemporary 
understanding of international commercial arbitration is irrelevant in so far as 
Ethiopian law on arbitration is concerned. For one thing, there is no law 
reserving arbitration to only commercial disputes as was the case in some 
traditional civil law countries. For another, Ethiopia is not a signatory to 
international treaties31 on recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards that 
allow commercial reservations - which would have necessitated a definition of 
commercial for that purpose.
A wider utilization of modern arbitration in Ethiopia has been delayed due to 
historical reasons. The reception of western style arbitration was not as 
revolutionary as the introduction of the law itself.32 First, one of the main 
reasons in the West for resorting to arbitration - the search for a dispute 
settlement mechanism other than the widely used courts - was initially missing 
in Ethiopia.33 Secondly, the poor utility of modern arbitration which ensued for
transaction and the place of arbitration are factors considered in deciding whether 
arbitration is international or not. Thus, international arbitration entails arbitration 
between (1) parties from different nations, (2) parties to an international transaction, 
or (3) parties to an arbitration agreement according to which a foreign place of 
arbitration is designated; see, e.g., Tweeddale, A. & Tweeddale, K.. (2005) 
Arbitration of Commercial Disputes: International and English Law and Practice. 
Oxford, OUP, at § 2.27-2.28 [hereinafter Tweeddale & Tweeddale]; Chiasson, E. 
(1999) A Comparison of International Arbitration Rules: the Practical Perspective. In: 
Campbell, D. & Birkeland, B. eds. Lawyering in International Market. New York, 
Transnational Publishers Inc., pp. 339-341.
30 See further discussions in section 4 infra.
31 Such as the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards.
32 See generally Beckstrom, J. (1973) “Transplantation of Legal Systems: an Early 
Report on the Reception of Western Laws in Ethiopia”, American Journal of 
Comparative Law (21), p. 567 [hereinafter Beckstrom]; and Sedler, R. (1967-68) “The 
Development of Legal Systems: the Ethiopian Experience”, Iowa Law Review 53 
[hereinafter Sedler].
33 In an article published few years after the 1960s codification, Robert Allen Sedler 
implicitly noted that Ethiopia was not as ready as its Western counterparts for 
arbitration or similar dispute resolution processes introduced by the law. He posits: 
“[unlike in Ethiopia], it is interesting to note that in countries with highly developed 
legal systems the trend is toward removing disputes from the courts and submitting 
them to arbitration and/ or giving jurisdiction to administrative tribunals”; see Sedler,
p. 608.
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some decades may also be attributed to “gross unfamiliarity”34 with modem 
arbitration.35
Fortunately, recent developments show that Ethiopia has gradually developed 
an interest for alternative dispute settlement mechanisms including arbitration.36 
Arbitration, along with other ADR37 mechanisms, is now a popular dispute 
settlement process among businesses - international or domestic. Inter alia, 
economic and time factors justify the growing popularity of ADR and 
arbitration. Litigating commercial disputes in courts is less favoured by parties 
because its financial burdens coupled with possible administrative barriers and 
corruption can “lead to distrust of courts”.38 In particular, judicial settlement of 
international commercial disputes is usually unattractive to at least one of the 
parties who might find submitting disputes to national courts unpleasant.39
34 Bezzawork states “...despite the fact that, we have elaborate and modern laws on 
arbitration (since 1960), there is still gross unfamiliarity with the meaning and 
application of arbitration”; see Bezzawork, supra note 27 p. 69.
35 in so far as international commercial arbitration is concerned, there has, however, 
long been a practice (among Ethiopian enterprises) of referring disputes [between 
them and counterparts in international commercial transactions] to renowned 
international arbitral bodies like the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in 
Paris. In particular, government enterprises submit their contractual disputes to 
arbitration; see, e.g., Re Baruch-Foster Corporation v Imperial Ethiopian 
Government, reproduced in EACC Reports of Arbitral Awards, Vol.1 (EACC, Addis 
Ababa, 2008), at 1-11; Re Imperial Highway Authority v Solel Boneh Ltd, Supreme 
Imperial Court, Civil Appeal No.670/57, reproduced (in Amharic and English) in 2 
Journal of Ethiopian Law 2 (1965) at 261-266.
36 See, e.g., USAID Report, supra note 21, pp. 66 et seq.
37Arbitration is distinguished from ADR (alternative dispute resolution) mechanisms. In 
particular, arbitration - unlike such ADR mechanisms as mediation - results in the 
production of a legally binding award. Yet, there are some who regard arbitration as a 
form of ADR; see, e.g., Goode, R., Kronke, H. & Mckendrick, E. (2007) 
Transnational Commercial Law: Text, Cases, and Materials. Oxford, OUP, at § 17-12 
[hereinafter, Goode et al.]; Fekadu, supra note 18, pp. 105 et seq.
38 Satarkulova, I., (2006) “International Commercial Arbitration in the Kyrgyz 
Republic”, Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law & Arbitration, 10, 
pp. 319-320; See also Redfern, A. et al. (2005) Law and Practice of International 
Commercial Arbitration. London, Sweet & Maxwell, at § 1-51[hereinafter Redfern]; 
Garnett, R. et al. (2000) A Practical Guide to International Commercial Arbitration. 
New York, Oceana Publications, p. 14 [hereinafter Garnett].
39 The choice of a neutral forum and tribunal matters a lot to at least one of the parties in 
international commercial dispute. Presumably, the home court of one party is not such 
a forum because the procedure, the language, and the lawyers are all alien to the other 
party; see Redfern, supra n. 38, at § 1-42.
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Improvements with respect to, for example, institutional arbitration are also 
indicative of the current trend toward a better utilisation of arbitration in 
commercial disputes. Two arbitral institutions - the Ethiopian Arbitration and 
Conciliation Centre (EACC) and the Arbitration Institute of the Addis Ababa 
Chamber of Commerce and Sectorial Associations (AACCSA) - have been 
established.40 These arbitral bodies primarily target at the business community 
as potential clients for their services. Moreover, as both institutions work under 
modern rules of arbitration and accept cases involving foreigners,41 they can 
eventually perhaps play a significant role as an alternative centre for commercial 
arbitration that involves transnational transactions as well.42
3. Aspects of the Existing Arbitration Regime
As noted above, the Ethiopian arbitration law is mainly based on the Civil Code 
and the CPC. While Title XX of the 1960 Civil Code contains the substantive 
rules on arbitration, the CPC carries rules of procedural importance. For our 
purpose, we may generally classify the rules as relating to (1) arbitration 
agreements, (2) the arbitral process, and (3) challenge and enforcement of 
arbitral awards.
3.1- The Law on Arbitration Agreements
The basis for arbitration, unlike litigation, is a contractual agreement between 
disputants. in the absence of an arbitration agreement, there would be no 
arbitration, except in situations where national laws prescribe mandatory 
arbitration.43
40 USAID Report, supra n. 21, p. 70; Tilahun, supra n. 17, p. 140; note, however, that 
the second of the two has recently suspended its arbitration activities.
41 Ibid.; see also Re Ethiopian Privatisation Agency v Atilla Yildrim. In: EACC (2008) 
Report of Arbitral Awards, Vol.1.
42 There has been dissatisfaction among Africans in general over the Eurocentricism of 
international commercial arbitration (see, e.g., Seznec, G. (2004), “The Role of 
African States in International Commercial Arbitration,” Vindobona Journal of 
International Commercial Law & Arbitration, 8, pp. 219-220; Assante, S. (1993), 
“The Perspective of African Countries on International Commercial Arbitration”, 
Leiden Journal of International Law, 6, p. 350). Ethiopia cannot be an exception in 
this respect since numerous international arbitrations involving Ethiopian interests are 
often referred to institutions in Europe, often at the inconvenience of Ethiopian 
parties; see, e.g., The World Bank (2004) Ethiopia: Legal and Judicial Sector 
Assessment, p. 38.
43 Under Ethiopian law, certain disputes are compulsorily arbitrable. For instance, a 
1998 Proclamation on Cooperative Societies requires the compulsory submission of
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Though modem arbitration legislation refers to arbitration agreements 
generally,44 some national arbitration laws still distinguish between two forms of 
arbitration agreements, i.e., arbitral submission and arbitration clause. The 
dichotomy between arbitral submission and an arbitration clause is known in 
Ethiopia as well.45 While the former is understood as relating to existing 
disputes, the latter contemplates future disputes that might arise in the course of 
the performance of contractual obligations.46
Arbitration agreements usually deal with a range of issues including types of 
arbitration, seat of arbitration, choice of law, composition of arbitral tribunal, 
language of the arbitration, scope of the arbitration agreement, and the like.47 
Also, arbitration agreements are normally subjected to statutes that prescribe 
substantive and formal requirements. Compliance with the statutory 
requirements is crucial, for the validity of the arbitration agreement may depend 
on it.48 Hence, due attention must be given to statutory requirements while 
drafting arbitration agreements.
Ethiopian law requires the fulfilment of certain substantive and formal 
requirements. The general substantive requirements relating to consent, 
capacity, and offer and acceptance are obviously relevant to arbitration
certain enumerated disputes to arbitration. See Art 49 of the Ethiopian Cooperatives 
Societies Proclamation No.147/1998.
44 Sanders, P. (1999), Qui Vadis Arbitration? Sixty Years of Arbitration Practice, (The 
Hague, Kluwer Law international), p. 155 [hereinafter Sanders].
45 Even though the English version of the Civil Code confusingly and consistently 
employs the term “arbitral submission” to generally refer to arbitration agreements, 
there are authorities that the English term “arbitral submission” is in fact a mistaken 
translation of the term “la convention d’arbitrage” from the initial French master text 
of the Civil Code. Besides, some articles in Chapter Two, Title XX of the Code 
expressly mention “arbitration clauses”, hence, affirming the Civil Code’s difference 
from its traditional civil law counterparts including the French Civil Code which used 
to deny enforcement to arbitration agreements over future disputes, i.e., arbitral 
clauses; see Bezzawork, p. 70; David, R. (1985) Arbitration in International Trade. 
Deventer, Kluwer Law Publishers, at §211[hereinafter David]; and Art 3328 of Civil 
Code.
46 Redfern, supra n. 38, at § 3-02.
47Often, however, parties simply refer to institutional arbitration rules instead of 
including all these details in their arbitration contract.
48 See, e.g., the decision of a Norwegian Court (cited in Redfern, supra n. 38, at § 3-09) 
that refused recognition to a foreign arbitral award due to the non-fulfilment of some 
formality requirements relating to the underlying arbitration agreement.
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agreements.49 Apart from these substantive requirements, the test of 
“arbitrability”50 and the “capacity to arbitrate”51 need to be satisfied.
Formal requirements in arbitration agreements usually relate to the question 
of whether the agreement is oral or written. The universal rule requires 
commercial arbitration agreements and commercial transactions to be in 
writing.52 Though oral arbitration agreements are rare in international 
commercial transactions,53 some jurisdictions including Ethiopia54 are ready to 
recognise them.55
According to Art 3326 (2) of the Civil Code, arbitration agreements are 
required to be drawn in the form required by the law for disposing of the right to 
which the arbitration agreement relates.56 Applying the theory of Art 3326 (2) of 
the Civil Code, some arbitration agreements must, under the pain of nullity, be 
(1) written, (2) signed by the parties, and (3) attested by capable witnesses. For 
instance, an arbitration agreement with a certain administrative body57 need to be 
(1) in writing,58 (2) attested at least by two witnesses,59 and (3) registered with a 
court or notary. understandably, such formality requirements are not good 
incentives to arbitral settlement of disputes involving administrative bodies.
incidentally, written arbitration agreements which may be valid for the 
purpose of the UNCITRAL Model Law or the 1958 New York Convention may 
not necessarily be valid under Ethiopian law. As Ethiopian law requires written 
agreements to be attested by two witnesses under the pain of invalidity, 
arbitration agreements contained in telex or other means of communication
49 Tilahun, supra n. 17, p. 119.
50 See further discussions on the issue of arbitrability under section 4.1 infra.
51 See, e.g., Ethiopian Mineral Development SC v JTT Trading, Federal Supreme Court, 
Cassation File No. 30727/2000.
52 The 1958 New York Convention, which is widely adhered to, requires arbitration 
agreements to be in writing to support easy universal recognition and enforcement of 
the same. Also, the UNCITRAL Model law and numerous national arbitration laws 
prescribe this formality requirement; see, e.g., Sanders, pp.155-158.
53 Bezzawork, supra n. 27, p. 77.
54 The a contrario reading of Art 3326(2), Civil Code.
55 Sanders, supra n. 44, pp. 155-158; Redfern, supra n. 38, at § 1-09.
56 Art 3326 (2) of Civil Code: “the arbitration [agreement] shall be drawn in the form 
required by law for disposing without consideration of the right to which it relates.”
57 Art 1724 cum Art 3326 (2), Civil Code.
58 The law, for instance, requires agreements involving the following transactions to be 
written: immovable properties, guarantee, insurance, and vessels; see Arts 1723, 
1725(a), 1725(b), Civil Code, and Art 7, the 1960 Maritime Code of Ethiopia.
59 According to Art 1727 (2) of Civil Code, written agreements are of no effect unless 
attested by two witnesses.
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which provide a record of the agreement are most likely to be invalid unless they 
relate to transactions which are not under the law required to be in writing.60
Overall, arbitration agreements fulfilling the above discussed substantive and 
formal requirements are generally enforceable. Non-performance of a valid and 
enforceable arbitration agreement by one party entitles the other to either 
demand performance or consider the arbitral agreement to have lapsed.61
3.2- The Law Relating to Arbitral Process
3.2.1- Selection and Appointment
Ethiopian law recognises the importance of the principles of party freedom and 
equality in the appointment of arbitrators. Parties are normally free not only in 
appointing arbitrators, but also in determining the identity, the number, the 
qualification, and jurisdiction of the same.62 And, any arbitration agreement 
must, under the pain of nullity, confer each party equal right regarding 
appointment of arbitrators.63
The procedure for the appointment of arbitrators usually commences when a 
party to an arbitration agreement specifies disputed issues and appoints the 
arbitrator(s). Subsequently, the other party to the arbitration agreement is given 
notice to exercise his right to appoint arbitrators. Parties, however, may abuse 
their right to appoint arbitrators by ignoring a call to appoint arbitrator(s) 
without delay. if the arbitration agreement contains detailed provisions 
regarding time limits within which the later party is bound to designate 
arbitrator(s), the matter is dealt with in accordance with the contractual 
provisions. Otherwise, the gap is usually filled by either institutional arbitration 
rules referred to in the contract or national laws that usually contain default 
rules.
The default rule in the Civil Code64 sets the time limit at thirty days - which 
begins to run from the day when notice is given to either the concerned party or 
to the person entrusted with the task of appointing arbitrators. After the expiry 
of the 30 day period, a court shall, upon request, appoint arbitrators.65
Another statutory default rule relates to the number of arbitrators. The 
Ethiopian default rule on the number of arbitrators is two.66 The Ethiopian Civil
60 See, e.g., Bezzawork, supra n. 27, p. 77.
61 Art 3344, Civil Code.
62 Art 3331, Civil Code.
63 Art 3335, Civil Code.
64 Art 3334 (1), Civil Code.
65 Ibid.
66 Art 3331 (3), Civil Code.
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Code does not render an uneven number of arbitrators mandatory, and in effect, 
duly recognises the freedom of parties to opt for an even number of arbitrators.67 
statutory provisions dealing with cases where an even number of arbitrators fail 
to reach consensus on the award are, therefore, desirable. Accordingly, 
Art.3332, Civil Code, suggests the appointment of a presiding arbitrator where 
there is an even number of arbitrators.68
3.2.2- Challenge and Disqualification
The Civil Code contains rules entitling parties to challenge arbitrators. 
According to Art 3340, an arbitrator is disqualified, upon challenge by a party, 
where (a) there is doubt on the impartiality or independence of the arbitrator, (b) 
the arbitrator is not of age, sound mind or health, (c) he is unable to discharge 
his functions properly and within a reasonable time, (d) he is absent or convicted 
of a criminal offense. As a rule, a party cannot challenge an arbitrator chosen by 
him unless it is attributable to a reason arising subsequent to the appointment or 
for reasons he had knowledge of only after the appointment.69 An unsuccessful 
challenge for disqualification of an arbitrator is appealable to the court of law 
within ten days.70 This may at times be abused because the right of appeal may 
be used by parties to delay the proceedings on the merits.71
3.2.3- Severability and Kompetenze-Kompetenze
often, the jurisdiction of arbitrators is defined in the arbitration agreement. 
Apart from the arbitration agreement, mandatory statutory provisions set limits 
on the competence of arbitrators.72 Currently, however, there are few limits on 
the power of arbitrators to rule on a range of issues, both preliminary and core. 
in particular, numerous jurisdictions allow arbitrators to rule on their 
jurisdiction, subject to judicial review only after an award on the merits has been 
rendered; hence the principle of Kompetenze-Kompetenze.73 This approach is
67 Art 3331 (2), Civil Code.
68 Art 3332, Civil Code. Note that some jurisdictions solved the problem by mandatorily 
requiring an uneven number of arbitrators or through the appointment of an umpire 
(See Sanders, supra n. 44, pp. 232-233).
69 Art 3341, Civil Code.
70 Art 3342(3), Civil Code.
71 Yet, there are some rules that remedy the downsides of the appeal right. See n. 127 
infra and the accompanying text.
72 Such limits take the form of, for example, legally inarbitrable matters.
73 David, at § 309; Redfern, supra n. 38 at §5-41.
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widely praised for it saves arbitration proceedings from unnecessary delays due 
to “premature” court intervention.74
Apart from the principle of Kompetenze-Kompetenze, the principle of 
severability works in favour of a broad arbitral jurisdiction. where recognised, 
the theory of separability allows arbitral tribunals to consider an arbitral clause - 
based on which they assume jurisdiction - separable from the containing 
contract which is allegedly invalid. This, in turn, empowers arbitrators to decide 
on the validity or otherwise of the contract notwithstanding the fact that it is 
allegedly invalid.75 The principle is crucial in international commercial 
arbitrations which are more often based on arbitral clauses than arbitral 
submissions.76
The two concepts are often interlinked, even sometimes confused.77 A 
complete Kompetenze-Kompetenze doctrine would, however, embrace the 
principle of separability.78
Ethiopian law recognises contractual freedom of parties - to an arbitration 
agreement - to authorise arbitrators to decide on disputes relating to their 
jurisdiction.79 Yet, the law provides two caveats. First, contractual provisions 
relating to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator shall be interpreted restrictively.80 
Second, and most importantly, parties to an arbitration agreement may in no 
case authorise arbitrators to decide on the validity of the arbitration agreement. 
The second qualification apparently ousts arbitrators from jurisdiction regarding 
matters relating to the validity of arbitration agreement. Put in other words, the 
Ethiopian version of Kompetenze-Kompetenze is qualified by the doctrine of
74 Gaillard, E. (2006) Reflections on the Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International 
Arbitration. In: Mistelis L. & Lew J. eds. Pervasive Problems in International 
Arbitration. Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, at § 10-21 [hereinafter 
Gaillard]; David, supra n. 45, at § 309.
75 However, the last word on the issue of validity would be given by courts who at a 
later stage may review the decision of the arbitrators on the matter.
76 Redfern, supra n. 38, at § 3-02.
77 David, supra n. 45, at § 209; Redfern, supra n. 38, at § 5-42.
78 Barcelo, J. (2003) Who Decides the Arbitrators’ Jurisdiction? Separability and 
Competence-Competence in Transnational Perspective, Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law, 36, p. 1122; Redfern, supra n. 38, at § 5-41 - 5-42; Tweeddale & 
Tweeddale, supra n. 29, at§ 9-18.
79 Art 3330 (2), Civil Code.
80 Ibid, Art 3329.
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“inseparability” - which allows initial judicial scrutiny of issues regarding the 
validity of arbitration agreements.81
3.2.4- Procedure before an Arbitral Tribunal
The main rules governing the procedure of arbitration are contained in Art 317 
of CPC. The first paragraph of Art 317 of CPC requires a degree of similarity 
between the procedure in arbitration and court proceedings. Mindful of the 
merits of avoiding any interpretation that would disturb the relative informality 
of the arbitral proceedings, scholars have long considered Art 317 as imposing a 
soft requirement of similarity designed only to ensure procedural fairness in 
arbitration.82 Elaborating on what particular similarity is required to exist 
between the procedure before an arbitration tribunal and a civil court, Art 317 
(2) of CPC provides that arbitral procedure must at least be as fair as to enable 
parties to present their case and evidence.
3. 3- The Law Relating to Challenge and Enforcement of 
Arbitral Awards
An arbitral award is legally required to be made “in the same form as a 
judgement.”83 Accordingly, an arbitral award must be in writing and signed by 
the arbitrators.84 The award must also contain the points for determination, the 
decisions thereon, and the reasons for such decisions.85 Where the award has 
been rendered by a majority decision, the minority must state in writing the 
decision which it thinks should be made together with the reasons thereof.86 87 
The reading of Art 318 (2) cum. Art 182 (1), CPC, implies arbitrators must 
always give reasons irrespective of the parties’ agreement that no reasons are to87be given.
Under Ethiopian law, parties to arbitration may appeal from awards. Art 351 
of CPC provides a list of grounds based on which appeal from an award may lie. 
Conditions and grounds of appeal may also be laid down in the arbitration
81 The UNCITRAL Model Law and numerous national laws on international arbitration 
recognise the jurisdiction of arbitrators to rule on their own jurisdiction, including any 
objections with respect to the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement.
82 See, e.g., Sedler, R. (1968) Ethiopian Civil Procedure. Addis Ababa, Haile Selassie I 
University Press, p. 388 [hereinafter Sedler on Procedure].
83 Art 318 (2), CPC.
84 Ibid, Art 181(1) cum. Art 318(2).
85 Id, Art 182(1).
86 Id., Art 181(2).
87 In contrast, the UNCITRAL Model Law allows parties to agree that no reasons are to 
be given in the award, in which case the arbitral award need not contain the reasons 
upon which it is based.
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agreement.88 Parties may either expand or exclude any basis of appeal from an 
arbitral award that would otherwise apply as a matter of law.89 It is to be noted, 
however, that Art 351 of CPC which, as a rule, allows broad judicial review of 
arbitral awards is unsuited to commercial arbitration with respect to which 
reduced judicial review is sought.90
Ethiopian law also recognises nullity actions91 as another means of recourse 
against arbitral awards. According to Art 356 of CPC, an award may be set aside 
where it is established that (1) the arbitrator decided matters not referred to him 
or made his award pursuant to a submission which was invalid or had lapsed; (2) 
the arbitrators, being two or more, did not act together; or (3) the arbitrator 
delegated any part of his authority whether to a stranger, to one of the parties, or 
to a co-arbitrator.92 Unlike agreements to exclude appeal from an award, an 
agreement to exclude a nullity action against an award is invalid.93
An award (other than foreign awards) that is tenable under Arts 351 and 356 
of CPC94, may be executed without any prior condition in the same manner as 
an ordinary court judgement after application for homologation and execution of 
the award.95 Recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards are 
governed by the rules contained in Art 461 of the Civil Code. Accordingly, a 
foreign arbitral award which passes the five tests relating to reciprocity, 
arbitrability, public policy, procedural fairness, and valid arbitration agreement 
would be enforced. However, a written application for the enforcement of a
88 Art 350 (1), CPC.
89 According to Art 350 (2), CPC, parties may waive their right of appeal. Yet, such 
waiver is of no effect unless made “with full knowledge of the circumstances”. See 
further discussions on this point under section 4.3 infra.
90 The philosophy of arbitrator autonomy and the “implicit realisation that arbitration is 
a unique method of dispute settlement which is a substitute for, rather than a part of, 
litigation” drive the present-day worldwide trend towards reduced judicial scrutiny of 
arbitral awards; see, e.g., Sanders, supra n. 44, pp. 318 et seq, Redfern, supra n. 38 
at § 7-01 et seq., Garnett, supra n. 38, p. 113; and Evans, C. & Ellis, R. (1973), 
“International Commercial Arbitration: a Comparison of Legal Regimes”, Texas 
International Law Journal, 8, pp. 24-25 [hereinafter Evans & Ellis].
91 Note that a nullity action is the only legally available recourse against arbitral awards 
under the UNCITRAL Model Law and numerous modern national arbitration laws.
92 Art 356, CPC.
93 Art 355(1), CPC.
94 An award remitted to arbitrators for reconsideration may also be enforced; see Art 
354 (3), CPC.
95 Art 319(2) cum. Art 461, CPC; international arbitral awards rendered by tribunals 
sited in Ethiopia are presumably enforced in the same manner.
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foreign arbitral award must be made to the Federal High Court.96 The Federal 
High Court then gives opportunity to the party against whom enforcement is 
sought to present his observations within such time as it discretionarily fixes.97 
No hearing is conducted unless the court for some special reason to be recorded 
decides to hear the parties.98 Normally, the court allows or refuses to allow 
execution on the basis of the application unless it decides pleadings are to be 
submitted. If the application is allowed, “the foreign award is executed in 
Ethiopia as though it had been rendered in Ethiopia.”99 The characterisation as 
Ethiopian of foreign awards is crucial, for it accords the foreign arbitral award 
res judicata status.100
4. The Role of Ethiopian Courts in Commercial Arbitration
The involvement of national courts is crucial to the overall efficacy of 
arbitration, both domestic and international. instances calling for court 
intervention may appear at all stages of the arbitral proceedings. Yet, there is a 
need to maintain a balance between the levels of court involvement and the 
smooth functioning of arbitration - which is a contractual alternative to judicial 
dispute settlement. In this section, we discuss the role of Ethiopian courts during 
the three stages of arbitral proceeding, i.e., before the commencement of the 
proceeding, during, the proceeding and after the rendition.
4.1- Before and at the Beginning of the Arbitration Proceeding
one of the issues that may initially call for court intervention is related to the 
enforcement of the arbitration agreement. It is the task of courts, not arbitrators, 
to enforce the arbitration agreement should one of the parties (1) bring an 
arbitrable dispute to a court of law or (2) refuse to perform the acts required for 
setting the arbitration in motion.101
Where a party insists on arbitration, Ethiopian courts have practically 
declined to assume jurisdiction on the merits and, accordingly, referred disputes 
to arbitration. This judicial practice has a long history dating at least as far back
96 Read cumulatively Art 11(2) (c), Federal Courts Proclamation, Proclamation No. 
25/1996 and Arts 456-457, CpC. According to Art 457, CPC, the application must be 
accompanied by (1) a certified copy of the award to be executed; and (2) a certificate 
signed by the arbitrator or the registrar of the institution [in case of institutional 
arbitration] to the effect that the award is final and enforceable.
97 Ibid, Art 459.
98 Id, Art 461 (1).
99 Id, Art 460 (3).
100 Id., Art 461 (2) cum. Art 460 (3) cum. Art 5.
101 Art 3344 (1), Civil Code.
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as the early 1960s. In Highway Authority v Sold Boneh Ltd,102 the then Supreme 
Imperial Court of Ethiopia affirmed the decision of the High Court ordering the 
government agency to comply with a clause of its contract with Solel Boneh Ltd 
that provided for submission of all disputes under the contract to arbitration. In a 
similar case involving a government agency,103 the Federal Supreme Court of 
Ethiopia denied a motion by the appellant government agency against 
enforcement of an arbitration agreement.
Numerous cases related to the enforcement of arbitration agreements involve 
government agencies. This is particularly because government agencies - the 
most notable Ethiopian participants in international commercial arbitrations - 
often try to take advantage of the unsettled Ethiopian law on arbitrability of 
administrative contracts. In Highway Authority v Solel Boneh Ltd, for example, 
the Imperial Highway Authority argued that Art 3194(1) of the Civil Code, 
which provides “the court may not order the administrative authorities to 
perform their obligation,” sets a limit on the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements regarding administrative contracts. The Court, however, ruled 
against the Authority. In so doing, the Court reasoned that Art 3194 (1) of the 
Civil Code does not exonerate a government agency from referring to an 
arbitrator since this particular provision is qualified by other supplementary 
provisions contained in the same Code.104
The holding of the Court, however, faced serious challenge upon the 
enactment of CPC, whose Art 315 (2) reads “no arbitration may take place in 
relation to administrative contracts ... or in any case where it is prohibited by 
law.”105 Government agencies are now provided with an alternative statutory 
provision to avoid arbitration of disputes. And, this provision has successfully 
been invoked by government agencies to challenge enforcement of arbitration 
agreements and awards. For instance, the High Court of Addis Ababa106 rejected 
enforcement to an international arbitral award against an Ethiopian 
administrative agency.
102 See n.35 supra.
103 Water Resource Ministry v Siyoum & Ambaye General Contractors, Federal 
Supreme Court, Civil Appeal Case No.19659/1997.
104 In particular, the court mentioned the Code’s provisions on administrative contracts 
are incomplete and as such supplemented by other provisions of the Code including 
those on arbitral submission of disputes, i.e., Art 3325-3346, which do not expressly 
limit arbitral submission of matters regarding administrative contract.
105 Note that the decision of the Court in Highway Authority v Solel Boneh Ltd came 
only before the enactment of CPC in 1965.
106 Water Supply and Sewage Authority v. Kundan Singh Construction Limited, Addis 
Ababa High Court, Civil File No. 688/79.
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Apparently, Art 315 of the CPC is explicit in stating the inarbitrability of 
administrative contracts. However, this has not dissuaded some from invoking 
the same provision, and in particular paragraph four reads “nothing in this 
chapter [Arts 315-319 of CPC] shall affect the provisions of Arts 3325-3346 of 
the Civil Code.” The text of Arts 3325-3346 of the Civil Code - which 
accordingly overrides the provisions of Art 315 (2) - is silent as to whether 
disputes involving administrative contracts are arbitrable or not. This statutory 
silence has been taken by some107 as indicative of arbitrability, as opposed to 
inarbitrability, of administrative contracts.
In Water Supply and Sewage Authority v. Kundan Singh Construction 
Limited, the High Court of Addis Ababa, however, rejected the argument of the 
Indian party that “Art 315 (2) of CPC should not be given effect since the 
overriding substantive law is silent as to the inarbitrability of issues arising out 
of administrative contracts.” The court’s decision has been seen by some 
commentators as an unconvincing attempt to “get around the strong point” 
under Art 315 (4) of CPC.108
The controversy regarding the arbitrability of administrative contracts 
survived the 20th century. In Water Resource Ministry v. Siyoum & Ambaye 
General Contractors,109 the government agency argued the contract in which the 
arbitral clause was contained was an administrative one, in respect of which 
arbitration was prohibited by law. In deciding the matter, the court went on to 
define, in light of the principles of Ethiopian administrative contract law, which 
contracts are administrative and which are not. Eventually, it adopted a narrow 
definition of administrative contracts which resulted in the exclusion of the 
contract at issue from what might constitute an administrative contract for the 
purpose of Ethiopian law. Then the court concluded:
“The appellant’s argument that the matter should not be referred to arbitration 
is based on the theory that the matter, though contractually arbitrable, is 
inarbitrable in law as it relates to an administrative contract. But, the referred 
contract does not qualify as administrative one in respect of which Art 315 (2) 
of CPC prohibits arbitration. Accordingly, disputes arising out of it may be 
referred to arbitration pursuant to the contractual stipulation.”110
The case is an instance of apparent judicial approval of the view that matters of 
administrative contract are inarbitrable under Ethiopian law. 107 108 109 110
107 Bezzawork supra note 27, p. 85; Zekarias, Keneaa (1994) “Arbitrability in Ethiopia: 
Posing the Problem” Journal of Ethiopian Law, 17, p. 120 [hereinafter Zekarias].
108 Zekarias, ibid, p. 120.
109 See supra n. 103
110 Translation mine.
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Nonetheless, in Zemzem PLC v Illubabor Zone Education Department,111 the 
Federal Supreme Court’s Cassation Division appeared to unsettle the above 
interpretation.112 The issue involved the interpretation of Art 24 of the contract 
entered into between the disputants. This article provided for the arbitral 
submission of disputes involving the parties with, of course, the possible 
alternative of judicial settlement of the same. The provision interpreted by the 
lower courts as warranting judicial settlement of the dispute as the concerned 
contractual provision had not excluded, but rather contemplated, litigation. The 
Federal Supreme Court’s Cassation division, however, interpreted the 
contractual provisions as only allowing arbitration, not litigation. Unlike in many 
of the cases cited above, the government agency did not invoke Art 315 of CPC 
which apparently exonerates it from arbitration. Nonetheless, the Cassation 
Bench should have dealt with it notwithstanding the failure of the Zone 
Education Department to invoke Art 315 (2) since arbitrability or otherwise of 
the dispute at issue is a public policy one.113 The failure of the Court to 
specifically deal with the issue coupled with the final ruling which compelled an 
administrative agency to arbitration led to a remark that the Bench’s holding as 
“hammering the final nail on Art 315(2)’s coffin” thereby heralding the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements over administrative contract matters. 
The ruling of the Cassation Bench seems to reinforce the dominant academic 
view114 that matters relating to administrative contracts are arbitrable. However, 
i think it is too early to conclude that that Zemzem PLC v Illubabor Zone 
Education Department settles the status of the controversial Art 315 (2) of the 
Civil Procedure Code as the Cassation Bench has not directly addressed the 
issue.115
The enforceability of procedural agreements by the parties is unclear. The a 
contrario reading of Art 317(2) of CPC indicates that parties are free to agree 
over procedural matters.116 In particular, they may exempt arbitrators from 111 112 113 114 115 116
111 Zemzem PLC v Illubabor Zone Education Department, Federal Supreme Court, 
Cassation File No.16896/ 1998.
112 For more on this, see Tecle Hagos (2009), “Adjudication and Arbitrability of 
Government Construction Contracts”, Mizan Law Review 3(1), pp. 1-32 [hereinafter 
Tecle].
113 Ibid, p. 24.
114 Tilahun, supra n. 17, at 126; Zakarias, supra n. 107, at 120 et seq.; Bezzawork, 
supra n. 27, at 83 et seq.
115 Tecle, supra n. 112, who holds a different view also concedes the decision of the 
Bench does not finally settle some issues regarding arbitrability of administrative 
contracts; see Tecle, pp. 24-26.
116 Perhaps, this article may allow arbitration by way of composition, i.e., amiable 
compositeur. See, however, Bezzawork, supra n. 27 (at 80) who argues that the
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complying with the statutory rules relating to hearing and taking of evidence. 
However, Art 351 of the same Code, which lists procedural irregularities as a 
ground for challenging arbitral awards, casts doubt on the unqualified 
enforceability of some procedural agreements. Moreover, it is argued the 
Amharic version of Art 3325(1) of the Civil Code, which appears to generally 
require arbitration to be conducted “in accordance with the law,” qualifies the 
provisions of Art 317 (2) of CPC117. The simultaneous existence of all these 
statutory provisions makes the intention of the legislator vis-a-vis the autonomy 
of parties to agree on procedural matters unclear. On the one hand, the law 
appears to allow parties to even agree over the inapplicability of the statutory 
rules on fair hearing. On the other, irregularities in the arbitral proceedings - 
which may, for example, result from the inapplicability of the statutory rules on 
fair hearing - can be invoked as valid grounds for challenging arbitral awards. 
However, it may be fair to argue that Ethiopian law allows parties to agree over 
procedural matters subject to the provisions of Art 351 of CPC and Art 3325 of 
the Civil Code. Accordingly, it seems likely that Ethiopian courts would be 
unsympathetic toward procedural agreements that aim to do away with statutory 
rules on fair hearing.
Apart from enforcing valid arbitration agreements, appointing members of 
the arbitral tribunals is another area where courts may participate during an early 
stage of arbitration.118 As per Art 3344(1) of the Civil Code, a party to 
arbitration agreement may demand judicial enforcement of the arbitration 
agreement if the other party refuses to perform the acts required for setting the 
arbitration in motion (e.g. appointing arbitrators). And, courts who are called 
upon to enforce arbitration agreement may appoint arbitrators on behalf of the 
defaulting party. The scope of the power of the court called to appoint an
stipulation under Art 317 (2) of CPC is qualified by the substantive law on 
arbitration, particularly Art 3325 (1) of Civil Code.
117 Bezzawork, supra n. 27, p. 80.
118 Art 3334(1) cum. Art 3343, Civil Code; for more on this, see Zakarias, Keneaa 
(2007) “Formation of Arbitral Tribunals and Disqualification and Removal of 
Arbitrators under Ethiopian Law”, Journal of Ethiopian Law, 21, pp.143-145.
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arbitrator is however unclear. Put in other words, it is imprecise119 whether the 
function of courts in appointing arbitrators is administrative.120
in practice, the role of Ethiopian courts in appointing arbitrator appears to be 
a judicial one. For instance, in Ethiopian Mineral Development SC v JTT 
Trading,121 where a party to an arbitration agreement approached the Federal 
First instance Court to appoint arbitrators on behalf of the other party which 
allegedly failed to perform its contractual obligation to appoint arbitrators, the 
Court reviewed the validity of the arbitration agreement. Although the court 
finally found that the arbitration agreement was valid, it did not appoint 
arbitrators on behalf of the defaulting party; rather it simply ordered the party to 
appoint its own arbitrators.122 Moreover, appeals from the decision of the court 
culminated in the Federal Cassation Bench which held that the arbitration 
agreement is invalid and hence unenforceable.123
This practice is not ideal for commercial arbitration in general and 
international commercial arbitration in particular. Even though the role and 
power of the court in appointing arbitrators is the subject of disagreement 
elsewhere,124 the prevailing view with regard to international arbitration is that 
judicial appointment of arbitrators is merely an administrative function which
119 Art 3334(1) of Civil Code, as per which courts intervene to appoint arbitrators, 
reads: “Where the other party or the person required to appoint an arbitrator fails to 
do so within thirty days, the court shall appoint such arbitrator.” Though one would 
tempt to argue that the provision limits the role of courts to only appointing 
arbitrators, the article does not expressly prohibit courts from verifying - which they 
in fact do - the underlying arbitration agreement.
120 If it is an administrative one, courts do nothing but appoint arbitrators without any 
judicial review of the validity of arbitration agreement. in contrast, if it is a judicial 
one, courts may review the validity of the arbitration agreement before they appoint 
arbitrators.
121 Ethiopian Minerals Development SC v JTT Trading, Federal Cassation Chilot, 
Cassation File No. 30727 [Ginbot 19, 2000 EC].
122 Note however that the court had the power and in fact the duty to appoint arbitrators 
in such cases; see Art 3334 (1), Civil Code.
123 For a critique of the decision of the Federal Cassation Bench, see Hailegabriel, 
Gedecho (2010), Managers’ Power, Ultra vires and Third Parties under Ethiopian 
Law: a Critique of Ethiopian Mineral Development SC v JTT Trading,” Bahir Dar 
University Journal of Law, 1(2) [forthcoming].
124 See, e.g., Sen, A. (2000) “The Role of Courts in the Appointment of Arbitrators -an 
Analysis with Reference to the Supreme Court of India’s Decision in S.B.P. v Patel 
Engineering”, Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law and 
Arbitration, 10, p. 46 [hereinafter Sen].
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does not require the exercise of judicial power by courts.125 It is commendable if 
Ethiopian courts decline jurisdiction to incidentally determine the validity of 
arbitration agreements when they are called to appoint arbitrators.126
Ethiopian courts may also decide over preliminary challenges to arbitration, 
e.g., application for the disqualification of appointed arbitrators. under 
Ethiopian law, an unsuccessful challenge for disqualification of an arbitrator is 
appealable to the court of law within ten days.127 Though the ten-day period 
seems to lessen the adverse effects of the appeal right, it does not rule out the 
possible utility of the appeal right to delay proceedings on the merits. The 
undesirability of the application of this rule to cases of international commercial 
arbitration - where dilatory intervention by national courts is worth avoiding, 
has long been recognised.128 As one writer notes:
“The party making the challenge should bear a heavy burden of proof, and 
challenges should not be sustained merely to avoid controversy, lest they be 
used for ad terrorem effect. Once decided within the arbitral regime the 
matter should be final and not subject to interlocutory judicial review. Even 
after the award has been rendered the challenge should not be subject to 
further litigation in a reviewing court, unless it can be shown that the direct 
result of the decision rejecting the challenge was a seriously tainted 
award.”129 [Emphasis added].
Moreover, Art 3342 (3) of the Civil Code allows judicial review of application 
for disqualification. CpC provisions on appeal from and setting aside of arbitral 
awards may apparently serve a similar purpose, albeit at a later stage.
125 Ibid, 52; note also that the trend elsewhere is to reduce judicial intervention in the 
earlier stage of arbitration. Thus, the principle of competence-competence empowers 
arbitrators to assume jurisdiction over jurisdictional matters including those related 
to the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement.
126 Nonetheless, a marginal review of the arbitration agreement before appointing 
arbitrators is necessary to save parties from future costs related to arbitration under 
invalid arbitration agreements. Besides, Ethiopian law reserves the power to rule 
over the validity or otherwise of arbitration agreement to courts (see discussions 
under 4.2). Yet, it is submitted that this can expediently be done at a later stage, e.g., 
during appeal and setting aside procedures, so that premature judicial intervention 
will be reduced.
127Art 3342 (3), Civil Code.
128 David, supra n. 45, at § 287; for a detailed analysis on the role of courts and current 
trends thereto, see Redfern, supra n. 38, Chapter 7.
129 Tupman, W. (1989) “Challenge and Disqualification of Arbitrators in International 
Commercial Arbitration”, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 38, p. 
52 [hereinafter Tupman].
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In a fairly recent case,130 the Federal Supreme Court denied an appeal from 
an unsuccessful challenge for disqualification as the appeal was brought only 
after an award by the challenged arbitrator was rendered. The Court’s ruling 
looks consistent with the spirit of Art 3342(1) of the Civil Code, which requires 
application for disqualification to be made before the giving of the award and as 
soon as the challenging party knew of the grounds for disqualification.131
A scenario that needs to be taken note of is a situation where a challenge, 
rejected by an arbitral tribunal, is appealed to a court. The issue that arises 
would be whether arbitrators, perhaps including the challenged arbitrator, can 
proceed with the arbitration process pending final court decision on the matter? 
Literature reveals the answer is not the same everywhere. In some jurisdictions, 
arbitrators are not bound to suspend the proceeding, whilst numerous countries 
oblige arbitrators to suspend hearing until the court has the last word on the 
application for disqualification.132 Rene David underlines the merits of the 
former approach, especially where cases of international arbitration are 
involved.133 Albeit risky,134 allowing the continuation of the arbitral proceeding 
by postponing any judicial review to only after an award has been made is 
recommended.135
Interlocutory judicial review of an application for disqualification is legally 
possible in Ethiopia.136 Nonetheless, there is no clear legal authority for a court 
to suspend the arbitration proceeding until its final decision on the matter.137
130 Siemens PLC v Berta Construction PLC, Federal Supreme Court, Civil Appeal File 
No.12648/96.
131 Under Ethiopian law, challenge can be brought as late as any time before the giving 
of the award. Yet, late challenges should be based on grounds that have only 
recently come to the attention of the party; see Art 3342(1), Civil Code.
132 David, supra n. 45, at § 287.
m Ibid.
The independence of arbitration from “premature” court intervention does not 
always guarantee efficiency. Although saving the arbitral process from early judicial 
intervention contributes to the prompt settlement of disputes, it is sometimes neither 
cost- nor time-effective for at least the party dragged to the arbitration. Yet, it is now 
widely believed that the downside of the independence (from premature judicial 
intervention) of arbitration would be lessened by such procedures as setting aside; 
see, e.g., Tupman.
135 David, supra n. 45, at § 287.
136 For more on this, see discussions in 3.2 infra”.
137 Yet, one would possibly argue courts do have the inherent power to order the 
suspension of arbitral proceedings whenever they think appropriate. Even more, the 
power of courts to order provisional remedies including temporary injunctions may 
used to justify judicial intervention at the preliminary stage of arbitration; see, e.g.,
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Practically, however, Ethiopian courts have ordered the suspension of an arbitral 
proceeding pending judicial review of an application for disqualification.138 
Such suspension orders - widely known as “anti-arbitration injunctions” - have 
been rebuffed by the concerned arbitrators139 and some scholars.140
Generally, Ethiopian courts play a positive role in enforcing valid arbitration 
agreements. Yet, their role in setting precedent over the controversial matter 
regarding arbitrability of administrative contractual matters has been elusive. 
Moreover, the much looked-for judicial restraint regarding interlocutory matters 
like challenges to jurisdiction is absent in Ethiopia.
4.2- During the Arbitration
Arbitration is a method of dispute settlement which is alternative to, not part of, 
court litigation.141 It is widely held that court intervention, especially during the 
proceeding of the arbitration, is undesirable as it may frustrate and disrupt this 
alternative dispute settlement process.142 Many jurisdictions have thus (1) 
relegated the role of courts, during this stage, to that of a supportive one143 and
(2) recognised the procedural autonomy of parties and their arbitrators.144 
Arbitrators are accordingly empowered to, for example, award preliminary 
interim measures and relief, including interim relief in respect of parallel 
proceedings; and they are not under obligation to seek the assistance of the 
courts.145
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
Art 155-156, CPC. Note also that the CPC’s provisions on stay of proceedings might 
be of relevance.
Salini Costruttori Spa v the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa 
Water & Sewage Authority, ICC Arbitration Case No.10623/AER/ACS (2001) 
[hereinafter Salini].
Ibid, § 125-178; more on the case will follow in the next section.
See, e.g., Bachand, F. (2005), “Must an ICC Arbitral Tribunal Comply with an Anti­
suit Injunction Issued by the Courts of the Seat of Arbitration?”, Mealey’s 
International Arbitration Review 20(3), pp. 47 et seq.[hereinafter Bachand]; 
Gaillard, supra n. 74, at § 10-21; Scherer, M. & Giovannini, T. (2005), “Anti­
Arbitration and Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Arbitration: Some Remarks 
Following a Recent Judgement of the Geneva Court,” Stockholm International 
Arbitration Review, 3, pp. 209-211[hereinafter Scherer & Giovannini].
Evans & Ellis, supra n. 90, p. 24.
Ibid.; Redfern, supra n. 38, at § 7-10.
Ibid.
Petrochilos, G. (2004) Procedural Law in International Arbitration. Oxford, OUP, at 
§ 3-73 et seq. [hereinafter Petrochilos].
Sanders, supra n. 44, at 271 et seq.; Tweeddale & Tweeddale, supra n. 29, at § 9-12
- 9-87.
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The autonomy of commercial arbitration from national court supervision is 
not, however, absolute even in Model Law countries where mandatory rules on 
independence and impartiality of arbitrators and party equality enjoy a complete 
free rein.146 Accordingly, the competence of courts, for instance, to entertain 
challenges to arbitrators’ jurisdiction before any award has been issued is 
recognised.147 This is particularly important to address the concerns of parties, 
who should not be forced to go through the whole process of arbitration which 
may be deemed a nullity afterwards.148
Pending the arbitral proceeding, the autonomy of arbitration does not 
preclude a party to an arbitration agreement from applying to the court in order 
to preserve his rights. The right of parties to apply to the court for assistance is 
imperative as arbitrators lack actual power - though not legal power - to compel 
parties to, for example, arbitrate and give evidence.149 For instance, court-issued 
summons are needed subsequent to a witness’s failure to appear in answer to the 
summons issued by an arbitral tribunal.150
Ethiopian law allows a fair degree of arbitral autonomy. it, for instance, 
empowers arbitrators to initially decide on their jurisdiction,151 to grant orders in 
relation to interim measures of protection and measures relating to the 
attendance of witnesses, etc.152 Arbitrators are the masters of their own 
procedure as long as they guarantee procedural fairness.153 Arguably, they can
146 Petrochilos, supra n. 144, at § 3-78; Art 18-19, UNCITRAL Model Law.
147 Redfern, supra n. 38, at § 5-47; Art 16, UNCITRAL Model Law.
148 Petrochilos, supra n. 144, at § 4-65; but see, Redfern, at § 5-47.
149 In some jurisdictions, arbitrators rely on the principle of adverse inference to 
sanction compliance with their interim orders; see Tweeddale & Tweeddale, at § 9­
67.
150 Art 317(3), CPC.
151 Art 3330(1)-(2), Civil Code. As seen earlier, however, this principle seems to be 
limited by a substantive rule contained in Art 3330(3). This provision expressly 
prohibits parties from authorising arbitrators to decide on the validity or otherwise of 
an arbitration agreement. It is thus the power of courts, not arbitrators, to decide on 
the [in]validity of arbitration agreements. See n. 81 supra and the accompanying
text.
152 The absence of express statutory provisions prohibiting arbitral tribunals from 
awarding preliminary or interim reliefs coupled with some inference from such 
provisions as Art 317(3) of CPC reflect the legislative policy of permitting 
arbitrators to award preliminary or interim reliefs. See also Tilahun, p. 137.
153 Procedural unfairness results in the annulment/setting aside or judicial review of the 
award afterwards; see Art 351 and Art 356, CPC; also Re Gebrehiwet Debesai v 
Fondiaria Fire Insurance Co., Supreme Imperial Court, Civil Appeal 
No.134/56[reported in Journal of Ethiopian Law, 2(2), pp. 267-275].
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be flexible in the realm of procedural fairness if they are authorised to do so by 
the parties,154 subject to the duty to respect the fundamental principle of equality 
of the parties.
Ethiopian law also recognises the importance of the right of parties to 
arbitration to apply for court assistance whenever appropriate.155 Such 
applications will neither be considered a breach of agreement to arbitrate nor a 
waiver of the agreement to arbitrate.156
Parties to an arbitration agreement approach courts, inter alia, seeking 
interim relief enjoining a pending arbitral proceeding. One of the pervasive 
problems in commercial arbitral proceedings relates to such relief which, when 
granted, potentially disrupts the arbitral proceeding. While courts in developed 
arbitral jurisdictions cautiously exercise self-restraint towards applications for 
relief enjoining a pending arbitration, i.e., anti-arbitration injunctions,157 a 
comparable caution is reportedly lacking in some jurisdictions like Ethiopia.
It has been reported158 that Ethiopian Federal Supreme Court accepted a 
party’s application to restrain an international arbitration proceeding pending 
court decision on a preliminary objection to the jurisdiction of the arbitrators. 
The application was brought based on Art 3342 (3) of the Civil Code which 
allows appeal against an application for disqualification turned down by the 
arbitrators. Though there is no express legal authority - within the pertinent 
provisions of the Civil Code and CPC - for courts to suspend the arbitration 
until they finally give a decision on the pending application for disqualification, 
Ethiopian courts have practically done so with the help of the CPC’s provisions 
on temporary injunctions and stay of proceedings.159 Such court injunctions, 
which unduly interfere with the arbitral process, have widely been dismissed as 
incompatible with the universally recognised principle of competence- 
competence and the overall efficacy of arbitral settlement of disputes.160 More 
frequently, arbitral tribunals against whom anti-arbitration injunctions were 
issued by courts in the seat161 state refuse to suspend the arbitration.162
154
155
156
157
158
159
160 
161
The phrase “unless by the submission it has been exempted from doing so” in Art 
317(2) of CPC warrant such an argument.
Art 317(3), CPC; Art 3344(2), Civil Code.
Ibid.
Redfern, supra n. 38, at § 7-33 et seq.; Gaillard, supra n. 74, at § 10-15 - 10-16. 
Salini, supra n. 138, § 75 et seq.
Ibid., § 76 and 121.
Id., § 177; See Gaillard, at § 10-21; Scherer & Giovannini, supran. 140, p. 218.
Seat is the place where arbitral proceedings are undertaken. Note that in almost all 
cases, the seat is the place designated as such by the parties. As a matter of practice, 
however, arbitral proceedings may actually be held outside the designated seat. For
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In Salini,* 162 163 the ICC Arbitral Tribunal, which was ordered by the Federal 
Supreme Court to suspend the arbitration pending judicial decision on the 
qualification/]urisdiction of the arbitrators, declined to do so. The tribunal 
reasoned its decision on (1) purported duties it owed to the parties in the 
arbitration, (2) its duty to make every effort to render an enforceable award, and
(3) a theory that a state or state entity cannot resort to the state’s courts to 
frustrate an arbitration agreement.164 The tribunal particularly held that “its duty 
to the parties,” which according to it “derived from the arbitration agreement 
must be followed even if that requires non-compliance with a court order.”165
Many arbitration practitioners and scholars seem to sympathise with the 
findings, or at least the merits, of the arbitration tribunal.166 Yet, there are some 
who argue that injunctions issued by Ethiopian courts, which in the case at hand 
assume supervisory jurisdiction, must be honoured.167 Though unmoved by the 
argument of the ICC Tribunal that “it must follow its own judgment, even if that 
requires non-compliance with orders from the supervisory court”,168 it is 
regrettable that Ethiopian courts went so far in undesirably and, of course, 
unsuccessfully169 challenging (1) the principle of competence-competence,
instance, some arbitral proceedings wherein Ethiopia is the seat may in fact be 
undertaken in France. For more on this, see Rubino-Sammartano, M. (1999) 
International Arbitration: Law and Practice. 2nd ed. The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, pp. 563-570; Redfern, supra n. 38, at § 2-14-15.
162 See, e.g., Himpurna California Energy Ltd v Republic of Indonesia [reported in 
Yearbook Commercial Arbitration. (2000) Vol. XXV, pp. 186-215; Mealey’s 
International Arbitration Report (2000) 15(1), pp. A-i].
163 See n.138 supra.
164 Salini, supra n. 138, § 125-178.
165 Ibid., §142.
166 E.g., Gaillard, supra n. 74, at § 10-21; Bachand, supra n. 140, at 47; Scherer M. & 
Giovannini, supra n. 140, at 218.
167 E.g., Mohtashami, R. (2005), “In Defense of Injunctions Issued by the Court’s of the 
Place of Arbitration: A Brief Reply to Professor Bachand’s Commentary on Salini 
Costruttori S.p.a. v. Ethiopia”, Mealey’s International Arbitration Review, (20)5, p. 
44; Partasides, C. (2004), “Solutions offered by Transnational Rules in Case of 
Interference by the courts of the place of arbitration”, Transnational Dispute 
Management, 1(2), pp. 8 et seq. [hereinafter Partasides].
168 I sympathise with the argument of Partasides that (1) enforcing the arbitration 
agreement must also involve recognising the supervisory jurisdiction chosen by the 
parties and (2) that the fact that one of the parties to an arbitration agreement is a 
state agency of country X does not vacate, or invalidate, the parties’ agreement that 
the courts of country X have supervisory jurisdiction.
169 The suspension order by the Ethiopian court was not actually successful in vacating 
the arbitrator from jurisdiction; the arbitrators rather defied the court order and
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which is arguably170 incorporated under the national arbitration law and (2) the 
efficient utilisation of arbitration.
4.3- After the Arbitration: Setting Aside, Appeal, and 
Enforcement of Awards
To a varying degree, the role of courts in controlling the outcomes of arbitration 
- international or domestic - is universally recognised.171 Two important 
functions are undertaken by courts during this stage: entertaining challenges to 
arbitral awards and applications for enforcement of the same.
4.3.1- Challenging Arbitral Awards
Appeal is one way of challenging arbitral awards under Ethiopian law. Four 
general grounds of appeal are listed in Art 351 of CpC. Accordingly, appeal is 
allowed where:
(1) the award is inconsistent, uncertain or ambiguous or is on its face 
wrong in matter of law or fact;
(2) the arbitrator omitted to decide matters referred to him;
(3) irregularities172 have occurred in the proceedings; or
(4) the arbitrator has been guilty of misconduct.173
Additional conditions and grounds of appeal may also be laid down 
contractually. As a result, broad judicial review of arbitral awards is possible. 
However, Sedler in his Ethiopian Civil Procedure posits “an award is not 
subject to review [to] the same extent as a judgement”.174 For him:
“the decision of the arbitrator on [a] question of law or fact is not reviewable 
as such. It is only where the decision is patently incorrect, e.g., where he
continued the proceeding which resulted in an award that may perhaps have a 
limited chance of enforcement in the seat state; see Redfern, supra n. 38, at § 7-37.
170 See n.79-81 supra and the accompanying texts.
171 Redfern, supra n. 38, at § 7-41.
172 Such irregularities include (1) failure to inform the parties or one of them of the 
time or place of the hearing or to comply with the terms of the submission 
regarding admissibility of evidence; or (2) refusal to hear the evidence of material 
witness or taking evidence in the absence of the parties or one of them (See Art 
351(c) (i) - (ii), CPC). Note, however, that this provision is not compatible with Art 
317 (2) of the same Code which apparently recognises parties’ right to exempt 
arbitrators from complying with some procedural matters.
173 According to an illustrative list under Art 351(d), misconduct of arbitrator include 
situations where the arbitrator (a) heard one of the parties not the other, (b) is 
unduly influenced by one of the parties, whether by bribes or otherwise, or (c) 
acquired an interest in the subject matter of dispute referred to him.
174 Sedler on Procedure, supra n. 82, p. 390.
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enforced an oral contract, which the law requires to be in writing that is 
subject to review... Irregularities or misconduct by the arbitrator justify 
review only where they are such as to prevent a fair hearing or demonstrate 
that the arbitrator did not render an unbiased judgment ... it is important to 
remember that an arbitral award may not be reviewed on the same ground as 
a judgement.”175
Sedler’s view that arbitral awards may not be reviewed as widely as judgements 
is consistent with the jurisprudence elsewhere.176 Yet, the practice in Ethiopian 
courts does not support such a view. Inconsistent with what Sedler holds, courts 
have shown their willingness in practice to review awards on the merits when 
they are appealed.177 Moreover, courts do not have difficulties in proceeding to 
review the merits of arbitral awards as Art 351 (a) of CPC clearly allows judicial 
review of awards which are wrong in matters of law and fact.
Parties to an arbitration agreement may waive their right of appeal.178 
According to Art 351(2) of CPC, such waiver would be valid only when made 
“with full knowledge of the circumstances.”179 This provision is interpreted as 
prohibiting waiver (of appeal right) in arbitration agreement, since “at the time 
the agreement was prepared parties could not have had full knowledge of the 
circumstances”.180 Practically, however, courts have enforced finality clauses - 
which are waivers of appeal rights beforehand.181 Even more, the Federal 
Supreme Court Cassation Division has recently established a precedent that 
finality clauses bar otherwise possible review by the Cassation Bench of the 
Federal Supreme Court.182 Hence, wider judicial review of arbitral awards may 
be denied if parties, in their arbitration agreement, waive their right of appeal. 175 176 177 178 179 * * *
175 Ibid.
176 Most modern arbitration legislations do not permit judicial review of arbitral awards 
on issues of fact and law; see, e.g., Redfern, supra n. 38, at § 9-44.
177 See, e.g., Re Matt Construction Works Consultants Plc and Tambo International 
Plc v. Abu Dhabi Establishment, Federal Supreme Court, Civil Appeal Case 
No.16021/1997[hereinafter Matt Construction] and Re Gebrehiwet Debesai v 
Fondiaria Fire Insurance Co. ( cited in n.153 supra).
178 Art 350(2), CPC.
179 Ibid.
Sedler on Procedure, supra n. 82, p. 389.
See, e.g., Re Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission v Heirs of Ato 
Feleke Getahun, Federal Supreme Court, Civil Appeal Case No.351/88; Re Getu 
Geletu v Rina International Investment Ltd, Federal Supreme Court, Civil Appeal 
Case No.9440/1994; Re National Motors Corp. v General Business Development, 
Federal Supreme Court Cassation Bench, Cassation File No.21849/1997[hereinafter 
National Motors Case].
Ibid, National Motors Case.
180
181
182
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Instead of reviewing the arbitral award themselves, courts have sometimes 
remitted awards for reconsideration by the arbitrators.183 Remission, a procedure 
which enables the arbitrators to cure a certain defect, is however available only 
where the arbitrators either (1) omitted to decide matters referred to them or (2) 
erred on matters of law or fact.184 Courts cannot remit awards to arbitrators if 
arbitrator misconduct and procedural irregularities are involved.185
Apart from appeals, application for annulment is possible under Ethiopian 
law.186 Yet, the grounds for annulment do not include what in many other 
jurisdictions are recognised as such. For instance, procedural irregularities and 
arbitrator misconduct do not constitute grounds for setting aside an arbitral 
award. of course, procedural irregularities, along with arbitrator misconduct, 
may justify appeal from an award.187 Nonetheless, issues can be taken with 
Ethiopian law which allows only appeal, not nullity action, to challenge arbitral 
awards rendered by, for example, improper conduct of arbitrators. Annulment, 
rather than judicial review, of awards seems the most sensible remedy for 
challenges based on grounds such as misconduct of arbitrators and procedural 
irregularities.188 More alarmingly, since parties may contract out of any statutory 
grounds of appeal, courts could be left without an effective means to enforce 
mandatory rules on procedural fairness.189 This is particularly dangerous as 
Ethiopian courts are now vigorously enforcing finality clauses.190
183 See, e.g., Matt Construction.
184 Art 354(1), CPC.
185 Ibid.
186 See the discussion in section 3.3 supra.
187 See Art 351(c)-(d), CPC.
188 The law, perhaps in partial admission of the inappropriateness of the procedure 
under Art 351 to challenges based on grounds like procedural irregularities, 
differentiates between two sets of grounds of appeal - grounds (1) that trigger 
remission and (2) that do not (see n.183-185 supra). It is, however, unclear why the 
legislator, apparently cognisant of the unsuitability of procedural irregularities and 
arbitrator misconduct as triggers to procedures related to appeal, failed to further 
simplify the regime by, for example, including them under the most appropriate list 
in Art 356. Note that under the UNCITRAL Model Law and many other modern 
legislations, procedural irregularities and possibly arbitrator misconduct are grounds 
for setting aside - the only recourse against arbitral awards. See n.91 supra; Art 34, 
UNCITRAL Model Law; Art. V, New York Convention, Redfern, at §9-34.
189 In principle, procedural unfairness results in the annulment/setting aside or judicial 
review of an award (see Art 351 and Art 356, CPC). Yet, as “arbitrator misconduct” 
and “procedural irregularities” are not specifically mentioned under Art 356 as 
grounds for annulment, setting aside is not apparently possible. The two are, 
however, among grounds of appeal from an award under Art 351. Still, parties may 
contract out the two as grounds of appeal from an award (see Art 350 (2)). in such
328 Mizan Law Review Vol. 4 No.2, Autumn 2010
There seems to be some conceptual ambiguity in various Ethiopian court 
decisions regarding the difference between appeals from arbitral awards vis-a- 
applications for setting aside arbitral awards. Though the two procedures of 
challenging awards are different, some courts have erred in taking the setting 
aside procedure as another procedure justifying judicial review of arbitral 
awards on the merits.190 191 In my opinion, courts need not review arbitral awards 
when a party to arbitration applies for annulment/setting aside of an arbitral 
award. The task of the court called to set aside an arbitral award should be 
strictly limited to either granting or denying the application for annulment.192 
Judicial review of arbitral awards with a view to vary, reverse, or even confirm 
the same is however presupposed when an appeal - based on the grounds listed 
under Art 351 - lies from an award.
Generally, the practical role of Ethiopian courts in entertaining challenges to 
arbitral awards is not as negative as their role in dealing with preliminary 
arbitral matters such as challenges to the jurisdiction of arbitrators. Moreover, as 
witnessed in National Motors Corporation v General Business Development, 
Ethiopian courts are moving towards a new direction of enforcing finality 
clauses, perhaps at the expense of some public policy.193 Seen from the 
perspective of commercial arbitration, however, the courts are less parochial. 
Arguably, the precedent set in National Motors Corporation v General Business 
Development may take Ethiopian law to the level of modern arbitration 
legislations which permit arbitrators to act as amiable compositeure with the
cases, courts may not have excuses to justify either review or annulment of an award 
rendered (1) by a misbehaving arbitrator or (2) following procedural irregularities. 
Perhaps, courts may find some way out within the provisions of Art 350(2) that 
subject the validity of contractual waiver of the right of appeal to a certain condition; 
but see n.173-174 supra.
190 See n.178-182 supra and the accompanying texts.
191 In Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission v Heirs of Ato Feleke 
Getahun, for example, the Federal Supreme Court reasoned that it would have 
reviewed the decisions of the arbitrators irrespective of the finality clause had the 
applicant based its appeal on the grounds mentioned under Art 356, instead of those 
under Art 351! An identical reasoning is spelt in the judgement of the same court in 
Getu Geletu v Rina International Investment Ltd. Though the court is correct in 
holding finality clauses do not waive the right to apply for annulment under Art 356, 
it is wrong to take the grounds listed under Art 356 as alternative grounds of appeal.
192 Art 357, CPC.
193 See, eg., (2009) > “ftrtrtnc
Ethiopian Bar Review, (3)1, pp. 131-148.
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agreement of the parties.194 Incidentally, much of the limitations regarding 
challenge of arbitral awards have to do with the law, not courts.
4.3.2- Enforcement and Recognition of Awards
As seen above, commercial arbitral awards rendered by tribunals seated in 
Ethiopia are generally enforced (without any prior condition) in the same 
manner as an ordinary court judgement.195 Here, we are only concerned with 
foreign196 awards whose enforcement, according to Art 461 of CPC, is subject to 
some five tests.
Ethiopian law on enforcement of foreign arbitral awards is comparable with 
the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards. in particular, most of the grounds of refusal to enforce under 
Ethiopian law are similar to those recognised under the Convention. However, 
the latter unlike the former is pro-enforcement. The phrase in Art 461 CPC 
which provides that “foreign arbitral awards may not be enforced in Ethiopia 
unless...” sounds anti-enforcement in the sense that it makes enforcement 
conditional on the fulfilment (and presumably on the production of evidence to 
that effect) of all the conditions laid down in the law.197 In other words, unlike in 
most modern arbitration legislations, it seems that foreign arbitral awards are 
enforceable only exceptionally,198 not as a rule.
Art 461 is titled enforcement of foreign awards and omits recognition - 
which, under comparable national and international laws,199 is addressed 
together with enforcement. The omission, coupled with the absence of specific 
statutory provisions governing the recognition of foreign awards, invites a query 194 195 196 197 198 199
194 Modern arbitration laws allow amiable compositeur (See Tweeddale & Tweeddale, 
supra n. 29, at § 9-12). Yet, the status of Ethiopian law regarding amiable 
compositeur is unclear and, hence, subject to diverse opinion (see, e.g., Tilahun, 
supra n. 17, p.138, Bezzawork, supra n. 27, p. 80). Given the recent decision of the 
Federal Cassation’s Chilot in National Motors Case, it may however be argued that 
Ethiopian law allow amiable composition. Crucially, the insistence of Ethiopian 
courts to honour party agreement excluding judicial review is a strong evidence that 
courts may tolerate arbitrators who, with the agreement of the parties, acted as ex 
aequo bono or in equity.
195 See n.95 supra.
196 Note that “foreign arbitral award” is not necessarily synonymous with “international 
arbitral award”; see n.28 supra.
197 An ideal pro-enforcement provision would rather, for example, read: “foreign 
arbitral awards are enforced in Ethiopia unless...” or, like in Art.V of the New York 
Convention, “recognition or enforcement may be refused only if...”
198 The way Ethiopian courts interpreted this statutory provision affirms this view; see 
n. 202 infra and the accompanying text.
199 For example, the 1958 New York Convention.
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whether the provisions of Art 461 apply to recognition of foreign awards as 
well. The answer to be given, though not always important,200 * is of particular 
concern with respect to types of awards which demand only recognition, i.e., 
which are defensive in nature. Given the absence of separate statutory guidelines 
on the grounds for refusal of recognition, it would be ideal if courts simply 
extended the application of the rules on enforcement to cases involving 
recognition.
Under Ethiopian law, reciprocity is one of the grounds for refusing 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Moreover, the onus of proving 
reciprocity is on the applicant as Ethiopian courts have practically declined to 
presume reciprocity. In the Paulos Papassinus case,202 the Federal High Court 
and, on appeal, the Federal Supreme Court denied an application for 
enforcement of a certain Greek judgement only because the applicant failed to 
prove reciprocity, i.e., that Ethiopian judgements are enforced in Greece. As the 
Ethiopian statutory rules on enforcement of foreign judgements and awards are 
not mutually exclusive, it is almost certain that the court would reach at similar 
conclusion vis-a-vis enforcement of foreign awards as well.203 In contrast, under 
the general international practice shaped by the New York Convention204 
reciprocity plays a meagre205 role and the onus of proof is hardly ever on the 
party seeking enforcement.206 After all, reciprocity is not included among the list
200 As enforcement often presupposes recognition, the omission of the term recognition 
in Art 461 may not be a big deal in cases where recognition is sought with a view to 
subsequent enforcement; see, e.g., Ibrahim, Idris (1999) “Ethiopian Law of 
Execution of Foreign Judgments”, Journal of Ethiopian Law, 19, p. 21 [hereinafter 
Ibrahim]; Redfern, supra n. 38, at § 10-10 - 10-12.
201This would make Ethiopian law compatible with the international practice set by the 
1958 New York Convention, under which grounds for refusal of enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards are equally applicable to cases involving recognition.
202 In the Matters of Paulos Papassinus, Federal High Court, Civil Case No.1623/1980; 
and in the Matters of Paulos Papassinus, Federal Supreme Court, Civil Appeal Case 
No.1769/88. In particular, the courts reasoned that Ethiopian courts are not bound to 
execute judgements rendered in Greece as there is no treaty of judicial assistance 
between Ethiopia and Greece.
203 Particularly, Art 461 (a) expressly cross-refers to Art 458 (a) - the very article on 
reciprocity exception via-a-vis execution of foreign judgment. Also, Art 461 (2) 
authorises the analogical application of the provisions on execution of foreign 
judgments when the enforcement of a foreign award is sought.
204 As of October 2010, 145 states are members to the New York Convention.
205According to leading authorities in international arbitration, reciprocity is rather
“becoming a relic”; see Redfern, supra n. 38, at § 10-27.
206 Art V(1), New York Convention reads “recognition and enforcement of the award 
may be refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that
4(2) Mizan Law Rev. The Role of Ethiopian Courts in Commercial Arbitration 331
of grounds of refusal of enforcement.207 It would be a ground of denying 
enforcement only if states opt for the reciprocity reservation under Art.I(3). 
Even then, it may only be invoked against awards rendered in a non-contracting 
state.208 Award from these states, however, may still avoid rejection when, for 
example, the rendering non-contracting state has a law allowing enforcement of 
awards rendered in the state where enforcement is sought. in addition, the 
presumption of reciprocity means foreign awards are in principle enforced, 
unless a defendant who challenges enforcement pleads and proves that a similar 
award from the enforcing state would not be enforced in the rendition state.209
in denying enforcement for a foreign judgement on grounds of absence of 
proof of reciprocity, both the High Court and the supreme Court are hindering 
the very purpose of reciprocity.210 The absence of any presumption that 
Ethiopian judgements/awards are enforced in a certain foreign state has in effect 
led to the refusal (by Ethiopian courts) of execution of judgement from a state 
that would actually allow enforcement of judgments/ awards rendered in 
Ethiopia.211 According to a certain critic, this may have far reaching 
implications, as it may well result in miscarriages of justice and negative 
impacts on the economy of Ethiopia:
“[T]he person who has obtained a judgement abroad at considerable expense 
and inconvenience [would be] subjected to another piece of litigation in 
Ethiopia on the same facts and issue...[U]nder the current mode of application 
of the principle by Ethiopian Courts, the mishap is bound to recur almost in 
every case. This makes the country a safe haven to judgment-debtors against 
successful litigants... [F]oreign businessmen may [also] avoid entering into 
transactions with their Ethiopian counterparts or they will simply increase
party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is 
sought, proof that...”[emphasis added].
207 See Art V, New York Convention.
208 Redfern, supra n. 38, at § 10-27.
209 After all, Model Law countries recognise and enforce arbitral awards irrespective of 
reciprocity! See Redfern, supra n. 38, at § 10-27; Arts 35-36, Model Law; and Art 
V(1), New York Convention.
210 The main purpose of the reciprocity is to ensure that states enforce judgements and 
awards rendered in the enforcing state; also, it is maintained that such purposes are 
not served at the expense of innocent judgement-creditors who seek enforcement of 
the same (see Ibrahim, supra n. 200, pp. 23-24). The importance attached to this 
principle is, however, in decline; see n.205 supra.
211 At the time the Ethiopian courts refused enforcement to the Greek judgment, Greece 
was a party to the New York Convention and had already had a modern law that in 
principle allows enforcement of Ethiopian judgements and awards; see Campbell, D. 
& Campbell, C., eds. (1995) International Civil Procedure. London, Lloyd’s of 
London Press Ltd., p. 357 et seq.
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‘the transaction costs of doing business’ in Ethiopia by demanding advance 
payment, guarantee and so on. In both cases, the business initiatives of 
Ethiopians would be damaged”212
The other downside of refusing enforcement to foreign judgments/awards only 
because reciprocity is not established relates to the judiciary itself:
“That Ethiopian courts deny res judicata effect to foreign [awards] means that 
they will retry the case all over again. This surely entails an unnecessary 
waste of the scarce resources and judicial time on foreign disputes.”213
As a matter of international practice, recognition and enforcement of a foreign 
arbitral award may be refused if a court in the country (where recognition or 
enforcement is sought) finds that the subject matter of the difference is not 
arbitrable under the law of that country.214 Inarbitrability (of the matter 
addressed in a foreign arbitral award) is one of the grounds of refusal of 
enforcement in Ethiopia as well.215 Yet, the uncertainties216 on a range of issues 
involving arbitrability under the Ethiopian legal system make Ethiopia an 
unsuitable jurisdiction for easy enforcement of foreign awards against 
administrative agencies, to say the least.
As seen earlier, the Ethiopian jurisprudence on arbitrability of administrative 
contracts is less than settled. And, government agencies, the most regular 
Ethiopian participants in international commercial arbitration, have often taken 
advantage of the situation.217 For instance, in Water Supply and Sewage 
Authority v Kundan Singh Construction Limited,21 a government agency 
successfully moved the High Court of Addis Ababa to deny enforcement of an 
international arbitral award under the guise of inarbitrability of administrative 
contractual matters.219 On the other hand, the Federal Cassation’s Chilot has 
arguably set a precedent that matters arising out of administrative contracts are 
arbitrable.220 Though the precedent favours the enforcement of foreign and/or
212 Samuel, Teshale (2000), “Reciprocity with Respect to Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgements in Ethiopia: A Critique of the Supreme Court’s Decision in the Paulos 
Papassinuos Case”, The African Journal of International and Comparative Law, 12,
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
pp. 573-574.
Ibid.
Art V(2)(a), New York Convention.
Art 461(1)(e), CPC.
See the discussion in Section 4.1 above. Also, see Zekarias, supra n. 107, p. 120 et
seq.
Ibid.
See supra. n.106
See supra n.107 and the accompanying text; see also Zekarias, supra n. 107, p. 120. 
See n.111-115 supra and the accompanying texts.
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international awards relating to administrative contracts, the actual impact of the 
newly set precedent is yet to be seen.
Concluding Remarks
States benefit from an efficient regime of commercial arbitration. This is mainly 
because, the arbitral settlement of disputes better suits the business community 
by reducing the transaction costs of trade involving individuals, property, and 
business situated in different jurisdictions thereby facilitating trade and 
investment. Cognisant of this and other benefits of arbitration, numerous states - 
including Ethiopia - have put in place regimes that facilitate the utilisation of 
this alternative dispute settlement scheme.
As arbitration involves dispute settlement by private judges lacking public 
authority, the involvement of national courts is crucial to the overall efficacy of 
the process. However, the intervention of courts in this private dispute 
settlement process needs to be modest and consistent with the interest of the 
parties to relieve themselves from prolonged and costly judicial dispute 
settlement.
The role of courts in Ethiopia appears to be more than modest. Although they 
play a positive role in, for example, enforcing valid arbitration agreements and 
finality clauses, Ethiopian courts have generally assumed extended roles with 
regard to commercial arbitration which is supposed to function with minimal 
court intervention. in this regard, they are obviously assisted by the national 
arbitration law which, inter alia, licences (1) premature judicial intervention 
during arbitral proceedings; (2) broader judicial review of awards except when 
parties preclude the same through, for example, finality clauses; and (3) over­
stringent thresholds (which are nearly equivalent to refusal) in the enforcement 
of foreign arbitral awards.
it is submitted that courts should rather adopt an approach that fosters 
efficient arbitral settlements in local and international commercial disputes as 
Ethiopia normally benefits, rather than loses, from the same. A permanent 
solution would, however, likely be legislative rather than judicial, since the law 
appears particularly handy in developing jurisprudence hostile to commercial 
arbitration. particularly, the statutory rules that allow wider interlocutory 
judicial review of application for disqualification along with the rules that 
tolerate broader judicial review of arbitral awards must be updated with a view 
to minimising judicial intervention in arbitration. Moreover, the anti­
enforcement rules of Art 461 of CPC indeed require review so as to facilitate 
easier enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Ethiopia. Finally, the Ethiopian 
law on the setting aside of arbitral awards vis-a-vis an appeal from arbitral 
awards should be revised so as to provide courts with effective means of 
enforcing procedural fairness. _________ ■
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